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The Discovery and Use of Computerized Information:
An Examination of Current Approaches
In recent years, the legal profession has run head on into the increasing use
of computers and computerized information. Discovery and evidentiary
rules developed to deal with written documentation may not be flexible
enough to adequately cover this relatively new method of storing information.
This comment examines various methods by which courts have attempted to
deal with discovery and evidentiary problems involving computerized infor-
mation, and suggests certain areas that should be explored in supporting or
attacking the credibility of such information.
I. INTRODUCTION
The increasing importance of computers in society has had an inev-
itable effect on the legal profession. Technological advances relating
to computers have presented such novel legal issues as the possibili-
ties of patent, copyright, and trade secret protection for software.'
Computers offer the potential for increasing efficiency and productiv-
ity within the practice of law.2 Computers also present special con-
cerns as to the manner in which litigation is conducted.
Computerized information is unique. The computer stores in a for-
mat different from that of the traditional manual business record or
file cabinet. It lacks many of the guarantees of reliability found in
traditional methods of storing information. Computerized informa-
tion involves new technology and new terminology, both of which
can be confusing and distracting to a court or practitioner. It offers
the possibility of being able to analyze large amounts of data while
also increasing the possibility of unnecessarily disclosing information.
Computers offer new and often complicated ways of presenting evi-
dence while doing little to decrease the possibility that such methods
will be used to mislead.
This comment addresses some of the problems that will likely be
encountered in dealing with the discovery and use of computer-gen-
1. Lynch, The Hot New Areas of Law Practice, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1984, at 72.
2. See Blodgett, The Gospel of Computers According to Bernstein, A.B.A. J., June
1984, at 70; Frost, Automating Real Estate Closings, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1984, at 156; Gold-
stein, Law Firm Time-and-Billing Systems Compared, A.B.A. J., June 1984, at 137;
Grumer, The Paper Chase: Managing Your Records, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1984, at 74; Har-
rington, High Marks for Computerized Research, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1984, at 153; Naisbitt,
Megatrends For Lawyers and Clients, A.B.A. J., June 1984, at 45.
erated evidence. The first part of this comment focuses on how com-
puter technology has generally affected the discovery of different
types of computer-generated information. The second part deals with
some of the evidentiary hurdles that will likely be encountered in
trying to admit computer-generated evidence. The third part will
deal with factors to consider when attacking or supporting the credi-
bility of computer-generated evidence.
II. DISCOVERY PROBLEMS
A. Discovery of Computer-Related Information
Discovery principles should generally apply to computerized infor-
mation. However, the differences between discovery of manually-
generated records and computer-generated records should be noted.
These differences include the method in which computerized infor-
mation is stored, the ability to deal with large amounts of informa-
tion, and the lack of an audit trail in verifying information.
The problems presented by the discovery of computerized informa-
tion are partially due to the media in which the information is stored,
typically magnetic tape or disc. Because information stored in such
forms is nearly impossible to understand without some sort of
printout, courts can probably compel the production of a printout.3 It
remains unclear whether a party can compel the production of infor-
mation stored in a different medium. Where a large amount of infor-
mation is involved, it may be more convenient to produce the
information in a machine-readable form rather than, or in addition
to, a computer printout. Several courts have expressed a willingness
to order the production of information in machine-readable form.4
The computer's ability to manipulate large amounts of data
removes many of the practical difficulties inherent in discovering
large amounts of information. As computers broaden the already lib-
eral scope of discovery, the danger of unnecessarily disclosing sensi-
tive information increases. Both the discovering and the responding
parties must focus their attention on the purposes for which the dis-
covery is sought and the nature of the information sought. For ex-
ample, it would not be unusual in a complicated case for one party to
3. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a) provides in part:
Any party may serve on any other party a request (1) to produce and permit
the party making the request, or someone acting on his behalf, to inspect and
copy, any designated documents (including writings, drawings, graphs, charts,
photographs, phono-records, and other data compilations from which informa-
tion can be obtained, translated, if necessary, by the respondent through de-
tection devices into reasonably usable form) ....
4. See, e.g., Fauteck v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 91 F.R.D. 393, 389-99 (N.D. Ill.
1980); National Union Elec. Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1257,
1262 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Adams v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 220, 221-22 (W.D. Va.
1972).
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seek another party's entire data base. The responding party in such a
case should question the relevancy of the entire data base. Where
programming or data processing procedures are being sought, instead
of the underlying data itself, courts should allow production only
where the program or procedure itself is in issue5 or where the relia-
bility of the system is in question.6 Even where this information is
relevant, it may be privileged7 or work product opinion.8 The infor-
mation may also be protected by considerations of privacy,9 or may
fall under traditional trade secret protection. 1 0 In any such case, a
protective order should be considered."
Perhaps the most important difference between computerized and
manually-generated information is the lack of an audit trail.12 Since
information within a data base can be changed or destroyed without
leaving a trace, circumstantial evidence must be used to verify infor-
mation contained within the system. In the absence of an audit trail,
5. See, e.g., Dunn v. Midwestern Indem., 88 F.R.D. 191, 195 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (ra-
cially discriminatory standards were allegedly programmed into defendant's
computers).
6. Because reliability of the computer system is such an important factor in eval-
uating the credibility of evidence produced by the system, the reliability of the system
will commonly be in question. Thus information concerning the equipment, proce-
dures, and programming used to produce the information should be discoverable. Sev-
eral courts have recognized the impeaching party's need to obtain information through
pretrial discovery concerning the accuracy of procedures for inputting and processing
the information. See, e.g., United States v. Liebert, 519 F.2d 542, 547-48 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 985 (1975); United States v. Russo, 480 F.2d 1228, 1241 (6th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1157 (1974); United States v. Dioguardi, 428 F.2d 1033, 1038 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 825 (1970).
7. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) provides for "discovery regarding any matter, not priv-
ileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action .... "
8. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3) provides in part that even where material prepared by
an opposing party in anticipation of trial is ordered produced, "the court shall protect
against disclosure of mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of the
attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation." Id.
9. See, e.g., United States v. Liebert, 519 F.2d 542 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
985 (1975) (computer list of tax nonfilers relevant for showing the accuracy and relia-
bility of IRS computer system, but not discoverable because of privacy concerns and
the presence of alternative methods of securing the same information).
10. See, e.g., United States v. IBM Corp., 67 F.R.D. 40, 46-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (trade
secret requirements applied to computerized sales data).
11. See, e.g., id. (sealed protection for revenue, sales, and manufacturing data and
for expert testimony denied). But see Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co., 529 F. Supp. 866 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (sealed protection for sales data approved).
12. "The audit trail is the accumulation of source documents and records main-
tained by the client which are the support for the transactions that occurred during
the period. It includes such things as duplicate sales invoices, vendor's invoices, can-
celed checks, general and subsidiary ledgers, and all types of journals." A. ARENS & J.
LOEBBECKE, AUDITING: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH 440 (1980).
more emphasis must be placed on data input and retrieval proce-
dures. The adequacy of protections against equipment failure and
unauthorized use are also important points of inquiry. Any weak-
nesses discovered will prove valuable in arguing against the admissi-
bility and credibility of any computer-generated evidence.13
Various courts have recognized the aforementioned changes and
have adopted flexible approaches for dealing with the discovery of
computer-related information. Where the required information is
difficult to isolate and produce, the responding party may be required
to assist in the search for information by providing someone knowl-
edgeable with the system,14 or by writing programs to aid in the
search of the system and the accumulation of data.15 Where actual
data processed through the system is sought for purposes of impeach-
ing the accuracy of the system, and for some reason cannot be pro-
duced, actual testing of the system may be a viable alternative.16
While computers may increase discovery costs as illustrated above,
the principles for allocating such costs should not change. The bur-
den of producing the evidence will usually remain on the responding
party, although the court retains the power to prevent abuse. 17 In
practice, the willingness of the courts to allow the discovery of com-
puterized information has been matched by a tendency to place its
costs on the party seeking discovery.' 8 The power to allocate costs
remains largely within the discretion of the trial court,19 although
there are limits.20
B. Discovery of Litigation Support Systems
Because computerized litigation support systems 21 are developed in
13. See infra notes 101-21 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., Greyhound Computer Corp. v. IBM Corp., 3 Computer L. Serv. Rep.
138 (D. Minn. 1971).
15. See, e.g., Bell v. Automobile Club of Mich., 80 F.R.D. 228 (E.D. Mich. 1978), ap-
peal dismissed, 601 F.2d 5687 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 918 (1979).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Liebert, 519 F.2d 542 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
985 (1975).
17. See infra note 20.
18. See, e.g., Adams v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 220, 222 (W.D. Va. 1972);
Pearl Brewing Co. v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 415 F. Supp. 1122, 1141 (S.D. Tex.
1976).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Davey, 543 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1976) (refusal to place
duplication costs on the discovering party).
20. See, e.g., Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340 (1978) (reversed
lower court ruling placing costs of over $16,000 incurred in retrieving computerized in-
formation on the responding party).
21. In general terms, a computerized litigation support system replaces "the trial
notebooks, tab locators, or card indexes which lawyers have long used to find relevant
material in the mass of pretrial pleadings, discovered information, interviews, affida-
vits, legal research, and transcripts of hearings." Sherman & Kinnard, The Develop-
ment, Discovery, and Use of Computer Support Systems in Achieving Ffficiency in
Litigation, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 268-69 (1979). See also Goodrich, Lawyers' Consider-
[Vol. 13: 405, 1986] Computer Law
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preparation for litigation, their discovery falls under the provisions of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3).22 If the discovering party
can demonstrate substantial need23 of the materials and an inability
to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials without undue
hardship,24 then the question arises whether a computerized litiga-
tion support system will be protected by the work product rule.
2 5
There are several ways in which discovery of an opponent's com-
puterized litigation support system could reveal attorney's work
product opinion.26 The method of indexing documents could reveal
an attorney's work product opinion, especially where the documents
are arranged as to issues rather than objective terms, such as dates,
names, and places.27 Although parties could conceivably try to index
on the basis of subjective criteria alone, this will not likely succeed
because the benefits of a versatile information retrieval system would
be lost.28 Where both subjective and objective criteria are used to in-
dex, the responding party could still be compelled to retrieve docu-
ments using the objective criteria. Where documents are
ations and Requirements for Systems Support During Discovery, 14 JURIMETRICS J. 5
(1974) (special issue); Halladay, Anatomy of an Automated Lawsuit, 3 LITIGATION 13
(Spring 1977); Halverson, Coping With the Fruits of Discovery in the Complex Case -
The Systems Approach to Litigation Support, 44 ANTITRUST L.J. 39 (1975); Olson, Law-
yers' Considerations and Requirements for Systems Support During Trial Preparation
and Conduct, 14 JURIMETRICS J. 20 (1974) (special issue); Olson & Goodrich, Litigation
Support Systems - Present Status and Future Use, 11 FORUM 832 (1976); Prendergast,
The Use of Data Processing in Litigation, 17 JURIMETRICS J. 227 (1977); Rust & Rome,
The Combination of a Manual and an Automated Approach to Trial Preparation, 11
FORUM 810 (1976); Sanders, Employment of Litigation Support Systems in Preparation
of a Products Liability Case, 11 FORUM 918 (1976); Sidney, A Trial Lawyer's Solution
to an Age-Old Problem Using a High-Speed Idiot With a Long Memory, 11 FORUM 865
(1976); Turner, The Employment of Modern Techniques and Technology in Trial Prep-
aration, 11 FORUM 797 (1976); Vovakis, Litigation File Management: Preparation for
Trial, 11 FORUM 820 (1976).
22. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) provides that materials prepared in anticipation of liti-
gation can be discovered "only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has
substantial need of the materials in the preparation of his case and that he is unable
without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other
means." Id.
23. See 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2025, at
211-28 (1972 & Supp. 1985); Sherman & Kinnard, supra note 21, at 274-76.
24. See supra note 23.
25. The protection of an attorney's work product is provided for in FED. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(3). Where discovery of trial preparation materials is ordered, that section states
in part that "the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, con-
clusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party
concerning the litigation." Id.
26. Sherman & Kinnard, supra note 21, at 284-90.
27. Id. at 286-87.
28. Id.
summarized, the content of a summary stored within the system may
reveal work product opinion.29 The dangers present in allowing dis-
covery of systems that use summaries or subjective indexing can be
minimized by disclosing only the identity of documents within the
system. 30 Although identification of the documents alone may reveal
work product opinion, this argument is unpersuasive. Placing a docu-
ment within a litigation support system should not automatically
make that document the subject of work product opinion, and should
not prevent the disclosure of the identity of documents.31
Although there are few cases on point,32 once the substantial need
and undue hardship requirements are met, materials within oppo-
nent's litigation support system should be discoverable. Discovery of
entire documents should be allowed where the system is little more
than a repository for miscellaneous documents. Where an attorney
for the responding party is heavily involved in the system's design
and implementation, discovery should be restricted. However, the
mere identity of documents within the system should still be discov-
erable. The work product privilege should not come into play where
one side is seeking to facilitate discovery by having the opposing
party use its litigation support system in the production of a
document.
C. Discovery of an Opponent's Experts
Pretrial discovery is perhaps the main tool in the effort to discredit
an opponent's computerized evidence, especially when this informa-
tion comes in the form of models and simulations prepared by an ex-
pert.33 Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, an expert is not
required to disclose on direct examination the basis for his opinion.34
The expert can also base his opinion on evidence, which might other-
wise be inadmissible, 35 such as a model. These rules, together with
29. Id. at 287-90.
30. Id. at 287.
31. See, e.g., United States v. AT&T, 461 F. Supp. 1314, 1339 n.76 (D.D.C. 1978)
(court suggested that the document selection process might not constitute work prod-
uct within the meaning of FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)).
32. See In re IBM Peripherals, 5 Computer L. Serv. Rep. 878 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (dis-
covery of defendant's computerized litigation support system barred). For criticism of
this decision, see Comment, Computer Discovery in Federal Litigation: Playing by the
Rules, 69 GEO. L.J. 1465, 1475 (1981); see also Sherman & Kinnard, supra note 21, at
276-78.
33. See, e.g., Shu-Tao Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 574 F. Supp. 1407 (S.D.N.Y.
1983), rev'd, 742 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1984) (limitation on discovery of computer program
used to form opinion by plaintiff's expert partly responsible for reversal).
34. FED. R. EvID. 703 states: "The expert may testify in terms of opinion or infer-
ence and give his reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or
data, unless the court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to
disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination." Id.
35. FED. R. EVID. 705 states:
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the notion that cross-examination is an effective means of discredit-
ing an expert witness, place the burden of being sufficiently informed
on the opposing party in order to conduct an effective cross-examina-
tion. In light of the sophisticated nature of some computer models, 36
this knowledge must be gained through pretrial discovery, preferably
conducted with the aid of an expert.
The clearest situation illustrating when discovery of an opponent's
experts will be allowed occurs when the expert plans to present at
trial conclusions based upon computer models and simulations. In or-
der to properly challenge an expert's conclusions, some commenta-
tors have suggested that the opposing party should be given access to
the underlying data used by the model, the programs used to manipu-
late the data, and the theories upon which the system is premised.37
Courts will not, however, necessarily grant this right to the oppos-
ing party. In Perma Research & Development v. Singer Co., 38 the dis-
trict court allowed expert testimony based on a computer simulation
without requiring that programs and theories involved in the simula-
tion be disclosed prior to trial. Although the case was upheld on ap-
peal, the appellate decision is often noted for Justice Clark's
comment:
[Ilt might have been better practice for opposing counsel to arrange for the
delivery of all details of the underlying data and theorems employed in these
simulations in advance of trial to both avoid unnecessarily belabored discus-
sion of highly technical, tangential issues at trial, Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(4)(A),
and protect truly propietary [sic] aspects of the programs. 3 9
Also noteworthy is Judge Van Graafeiland's vigorous dissent.40
Where discovery of an expert is allowed, the discovering party is
usually given wide latitude. While Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(4) names interrogatories as the usual methodology of discov-
ery,4 1 it also provides for any other means of discovery as the court
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opin-
ion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or
before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the par-
ticular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or
data need not be admissible in evidence.
36. See, e.g., Harper, Computer Evidence is Coming, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1984, at 80
(computer-simulated reenactment of auto accident admitted as evidence to prove that
the defendant was not driving).
37. 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2218, at 660
(1970). 1-pt.2 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, MANUAL COMPLEX LITIGATION,
2.715 (2d ed. 1984).
38. 542 F.2d 111 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 987 (1976).
39. Id. at 115.
40. Id. at 116 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
41. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i).
deems appropriate. 42 Reports, notes, and other memoranda are prob-
ably subject to discovery, although the discovering party may have to
bear the costs. 43 The discoverability of expert information is one of
the reasons why it has been suggested that communications with an
expert, especially one who will testify at trial, should be limited.44
Where an opponent retains an expert in anticipation of litigation,
but he is not expected to be called as a witness at trial, the discovera-
bility of information relating to the expert is not as clearly defined.
Although at least one commentator has described such an expert as
"largely immune" from discovery, there are situations where discov-
ery will be allowed. In Pearl Brewing Co. v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing
Co., 45 plaintiffs sought to prove anticompetitive conduct and con-
structed a model simulating the beer industry in Texas. The model
was to be used by plaintiff's expert economist, Dr. Massy. The court
ordered that all documentation of the system be produced. The court
also allowed the discovery of two experts whom plaintiffs did not in-
tend to call at trial. The court analyzed Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 26(b)(4) and found that the "exceptional circumstances"
necessary to justify the discovery of nontrial experts existed in the
case. Factors contributing to this finding included: the inability of
the trial expert to provide information as to the programming used in
the system; the close relationship between the information known by
the nontrial experts and the conclusions to which the trial expert
was expected to testify; and the absence of improper motive 46 on the
part of the discovering party.
It is arguable whether experts can be questioned about alternative
systems which will not be used at trial. The court in Pearl allowed
such discovery with respect to trial experts. The court applied the
"exceptional circumstances" analysis to the question of whether non-
trial experts can be so questioned, and denied discovery. The court
held that the discovering party must first show that the information
sought is not otherwise obtainable through the trial expert.47
42. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(ii).
43. Quadrini v. Sikorsky Aircraft Div., United Aircraft Corp., 74 F.R.D. 594 (D.
Conn. 1977).
44. See Daniels, Managing Litigation Experts, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1984, at 64.
45. 415 F. Supp. 1122, 1137-40 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
46. Examples of improper motive include the desire to avoid the cost of compen-
sating expert witnesses and the desire to develop one's own case entirely from the
mouth of an opponent's experts. Id at 1138.
An assumption running throughout the present analysis is that the information
sought cannot otherwise be independently obtained without expending inordinate
amounts of time, money, or resources. Id.
47. Id. at 1140.
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III. EVIDENTIARY PROBLEMS
A. Hearsay Rule and the Business Records Exception
Because computer-generated records are hearsay,4 8 they are inad-
missible as evidence unless they fall under an exception to the hear-
say rule.49 While this comment focuses on the business records
exception,5 0 other possible exceptions are worth noting. Where infor-
mation from a party's own computer is offered against that party, it
may be considered an admission by a party-opponent. 5 1 Where the
information originates from computers belonging to a public office or
agency, it may be considered a public record.52 Information which
48. FED. R. EVID. 801(c) states: "Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by
the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted."
49. Under FED. R. EvID. 802, "[h]earsay is not admissible except as provided by
these rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority or by Act of Congress." See generally Roberts, A Practitioner's Primer on
Computer-Generated Evidence, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 254 (1974); Comment, A Reconsider-
ation of the Admissibility of Computer-Generated Evidence, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 425
(1977).
50. The business records exception to the hearsay rule is embodied in FED. R.
EVID. 803(6), which states:
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts,
events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or
from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the
course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular
practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or
data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qual-
ified witness, unless the source of information or the method or circumstances
of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as used
in this paragraph includes business, institution, association, profession, occupa-
tion, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
51. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B). For an example of an application of this rule, see
Leone v. Precision Plumbing & Heating of S. Ariz., Inc., 121 Ariz. 514, 591 P.2d 1002
(1979). Plaintiff sued to recover on an alleged oral contract which provided for a bonus
of one half the difference between the estimated and actual cost of a construction pro-
ject. In holding that printouts, which were supplied on a weekly basis by the defend-
ant and which compared costs to date with total estimated costs, were admissible as
admissions by a party-opponent, the court stated: "[u]nlike a business record, where
admissibility turns on reliability of the processes which generate the record, . . . an
admission is admissible regardless of reliability; it need only have been made by and
offered against a party-opponent." Leone, 121 Ariz. at 516-17, 591 P.2d at 1004-05 (cita-
tion omitted).
52. FED. R. EVID. 803(8) states:
Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public of-
fices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, or (B)
matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there
was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed
by police officers and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions
and proceedings and against the Government in criminal cases, factual find-
ings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by
fails to meet the requirements of any of the other exceptions but nev-
ertheless contains circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness may
fall within the residual exception. 53
Although computerized records are clearly encompassed by the
business records exception,54 such records do necessitate a different
emphasis in the application of the exception. The basic requirements
of the rule still apply. However, courts must pay more attention to
the reasons behind the exception. The business records exception is
based upon the premise that records kept, and relied on, in the nor-
mal course of business bear sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness
to justify an exception to the hearsay rule.55 As the form of the rec-
ord changes from manual to electronic, the inherent guarantees of
reliability also change.56 Various methods of insuring reliability must
be examined in light of these changes. The elements of the rule
must be applied flexibly and with these considerations in mind.
Mechanical application of the "at or near the time" requirement
might work to bar the introduction of computer records despite other
indicia of trustworthiness. Where a computer printout was not made
soon after data was entered into the system, the record was arguably
not made "at or near the time" of the transaction. The better view,
and one which has been adopted by a number of courts, is that the
timeliness requirement applies primarily to the time at which the in-
formation was entered into the system.57 Several commentators have
law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness.
53. FED. R. EVID. 803(24) states:
A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but
having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court
determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact;
(B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than
any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable ef-
forts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice
will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a
statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of
it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or
hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to
meet it, his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including
the name and address of the declarant.
For an argument that the residual exception may provide a method for admitting com-
puter-generated evidence, see Comment, Guidelines for the Admissibility of Evidence
Generated by Computer for Purposes of Litigation, 15 U.C.D. L. REV. 951, 966-68
(1982).
54. "The expression 'data compilation' is used as broadly descriptive of any means
of storing information other than the conventional words and figures in written or doc-
umentary form. It includes, but is by no means limited to, electronic computer stor-
age." FED. R. EVID. 803(6) advisory committee note.
55. See M. GRAHAM, EVIDENCE, TEXT, RULES, ILLUSTRATIONS AND PROBLEMS 190
(1983).
56. See, e.g., Sprowl, Objecting to Computerized Business Records, A.B.A. J., Dec.
1984, at 128.
57. United States v. Russo, 480 F.2d 1228, 1240 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414
[Vol. 13: 405, 1986] Computer Law
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suggested that the "at or near the time" requirement is irrelevant to
computer-generated records.5 8 There is nothing inherently unrelia-
ble about information stored electronically in a computer's memory
for a period of time before a printout is made. The amount of time
between input and printout could possibly have a bearing on reliabil-
ity; a longer period may increase the possibility of errors or tamper-
ing. However, the duration of time passage alone should not prevent
computer records from being admitted.
Because it is anticipated that foundational requirements with re-
spect to computerized records will be met through the testimony of a
"person with knowledge," 59 the extent to which the witness must be
familiar with the data and with the system has been the subject of
litigation. The witness need not have personal knowledge of the sub-
ject matter of the transaction.60 It is not necessary that the witness
was the custodian at the time the record was made,61 or that the wit-
ness was employed at the time the record was made,62 or that the
witness was personally involved in the production of the printout.
63
The key factor determining sufficiency of the custodian's testimony is
his familiarity with the business and its practices for making, main-
taining, and retrieving records. 64 The witness must provide founda-
tion adequately insuring the reliability of the system producing the
record.65 Where a custodian or other qualified witness is not avail-
able, an adequate foundation may be established by other means.
66
U.s. 1157 (1974) (to hold that computer product and input must be produced at or
within a reasonable time of the transaction would too severely restrict the admissibil-
ity of computerized records).
58. See Younger, Computer Printouts in Evidence: Ten Objections and How to
Overcome Them, 2 LITIGATION 28, 29 (Fall 1975); Note, Appropriate Foundation Re-
quirements for Admitting Computer Printouts into Evidence, 1977 WASH. U.L.Q. 59.
59. See supra note 50.
60. See M. GRAHAM, supra note 55, at 193-94.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See American Oil Co. v. Valenti, 179 Conn. 349, 357-60, 426 A.2d 305, 309-11
(1979). The court reviewed previous cases for an indication of the proper qualifications
of the foundational witness and decided that the witness should have some computer
expertise to enable him to testify accurately regarding the system producing the evi-
dence. "What is crucial is not the witness' job description but rather his knowledge-
ability about the basic elements that afford reliability to computer print-outs." Id. at
360, 426 A.2d at 311.
64. Id. at 361, 426 A.2d at 311.
65. Id. at 360, 426 A.2d at 311. See inra notes 101-21 and accompanying text.
66. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1190, 1236
(E.D. Pa. 1980) ("[In the absence of a 'custodian or other qualified witness,' plaintiffs
must show regularity of practice in some precise and explicit manner, either by exter-
nal evidence or from the documents themselves plus surrounding circumstances.").
In some situations, it may be necessary to rely upon the content of
the statement itself as evidence of the witness' personal knowledge.67
In addition to the normal foundational requirements for business
records, 68 the admission of computerized records requires that a suf-
ficient foundation of trustworthiness be established.69 Courts have
disagreed as to what constitutes a sufficient foundation for computer-
ized business records.70 In general, certain features common to most
67. M. GRAHAM, supra note 55, at 195.
68. Id. at 189-204.
69. See supra note 58.
70. Beyond the application of the usual requirements for business records, founda-
tional requirements for computer-generated business records have varied widely. A
case often cited is King v. State ex reL. Murdock Acceptance Corp., 222 So. 2d 393
(Miss. 1969). That case stated:
[P]rint-out sheets of business records stored on electronic computing equip-
ment are admissible in evidence if relevant and material, without the neces-
sity of identifying, locating, and producing as witnesses the individuals who
made the entries in the regular course of business if it is shown (1) that the
electronic computing equipment is recognized as standard equipment, (2) the
entries are made in the regular course of business at or reasonably near the
time of the happening of the event recorded, and (3) the foundation testimony
satisfes [sic] the court that the sources of information, method and time of
preparation were such as to indicate its trustworthiness and justify its
admission.
Id. at 398. This formulation is not very helpful because standard equipment is difficult
to define in an area of rapid technological advances, and because the second and third
requirements add little to the customary requirements for business records. See Note,
supra note 58, at 84-85 (various formulations of foundational requirements criticized).
Nevertheless, King has been followed in some jurisdictions. See, e.g., Missouri Valley
Walnut Co. v. Snider, 569 S.W.2d 324, 328 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
Other courts have also used formulations that are not really helpful in setting ad-
missibility standards for computer-generated evidence. See, e.g., State v. Springer, 283
N.C. 627, 197 S.E.2d 530 (1973). The Springer court held that:
[P]rintout cards or sheets of business records stored on electronic computing
equipment are admissible in evidence, if otherwise relevant and material, if:
(1) the computerized entries were made in the regular course of business, (2)
at or near the time of the transaction involved, and (3) a proper foundation
for such evidence is laid by testimony of a witness who is familiar with the
computerized records and the methods under which they were made so as to
satisfy the court that the methods, the sources of information, and the time of
preparation render such evidence trustworthy.
Id. at 636, 197 S.E.2d at 536.
Cases following the Springer decision include State v. Hunnicutt, 44 N.C. App. 531,
261 S.E.2d 682 (1980); State v. Rodgers, 49 N.C. App. 403, 271 S.E.2d 535 (1980); State v.
Passmore, 37 N.C. App. 5, 245 S.E.2d 107, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 556, 248 S.E.2d 734
(1978).
Courts have frequently forsaken structured requirements and simply taken various
facts into account to determine whether the foundational requirement of trustworthi-
ness has been met. See, e.g., Reisman v. Martori, Meyer, Hendricks & Victor, 155 Ga.
App. 551, 271 S.E.2d 685 (1980); Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. B.L. Allen Inc., 138
Vt. 84, 413 A.2d 122 (1980); Roderick Timber Co. v. Willapa Harbor Cedar Products,
Inc., 29 Wash. App. 311, 627 P.2d 1352 (1981); State v. Smith, 16 Wash. App. 425, 558
P.2d 265 (1976).
The decision in United States v. Russo, 480 F.2d 1228 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1157 (1974), is an excellent example of a court considering the problems inherent
in computer-generated evidence. The court stated: "[T]he foundation for admission of
such evidence consists of showing the input procedures used, the tests for accuracy and
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computerized information should be addressed.71 Evidence should be
produced concerning the controls dealing with the input of informa-
tion into the system, programs and equipment used in processing the
data, security of the data processing center and the data base, and in-
tegrity of the output.7 2
B. The Best Evidence Rule
The best evidence rule mandates a preference for the production of
the original where a party seeks to prove the contents of a writing.7 3
The application of the best evidence rule to computerized informa-
tion presents some conceptual problems, and has generated discus-
sion by various commentators. 74 The rule should not, however,
provide a major obstacle to the admission of computerized evidence75
The "original" of a computer-generated record is arguably the elec-
tronic pattern found in the computer's memory. A litigant could ar-
gue that a printout represents a translation of this pattern into
readable form; thus it is not the original and should be excluded. 76
However, this argument is weak because it is virtually impossible to
understand computerized information without a printout.77 The Fed-
eral Rules solve this problem by taking the position that the elec-
tronic pattern in a computer's memory constitutes a "writing"7 8 and
therefore defines a printout as an "original." 79
reliability and the fact that an established business relies on the computerized records
in the ordinary course of carrying on its activities." Russo, 480 F.2d at 1241. See Note,
supra note 58, at 88-90 (arguing that even the Russo court did not go far enough in
testing the reliability of the computer printouts).
71. See generally Fenwick & Davidson, Use of Computerized Business Records as
Evidence, 19 JURIMETRICs J. 9, 18 (1978).
72. For a more detailed discussion of the evaluation of such controls, see infra
notes 101-121 and accompanying text.
73. FED. R. EVID. 1002 states: "To prove the content of a writing, recording, or
photograph, the original writing, recording, or photograph is required, except as pro-
vided in these rules or by Acts of Congress."
74. See infra note 76.
75. See generally 5 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 551 (1981).
76. See Younger, supra note 58, at 28, 29-30; Fenwick & Davidson, supra note 71,
at 13-14.
77. See, e.g., King v. State ex rel. Murdock Acceptance Corp., 222 So.2d 393, 398
(Miss. 1969) ("In admitting the print-out sheets reflecting the record stored on the
tape, the Court is actually following the best evidence rule.").
78. FED. R. EVID. 1001(1) states: "'Writings' and 'recordings' consist of letters,
words, or numbers, or their equivalent, set down by handwriting, typewriting, printing,
photostating, photographing, magnetic impulse, mechanical or electronic recording, or
other form of data compilation."
79. FED. R. EVID. 1001(3) provides in part: "If data are stored in a computer or
A litigant might also argue that where information in a computer
has been input from paper records, these records themselves consti-
tute the best evidence and should be produced.o Even assuming that
these records constitute the "originals," both the common law and
the Federal Rules allow secondary evidence where the originals can-
not be obtained,81 such as where paper records are destroyed in the
normal course of business.82 Where the original paper records are
still available, both the common law and the Federal Rules provide
an exception for voluminous data.8 3 Whether the content of a writing
is actually being "proved" is one of the more difficult conceptual ar-
eas of the best evidence rule, and one where litigants occasionally
stumble. Where the computer record is merely corroborative, the
best evidence rule is not involved; the transaction can be proven by
other means.8 4 Where the evidence is based solely on the printout,
the printout must be produced unless its absence can be adequately
explained.8 5
similar device, any printout or other output readable by sight, shown to reflect the
data accurately, is an 'original'."
It has been suggested that FED. R. EVID. 1001(3) should be construed to require only
the minimal showing that the data was not altered during printout, and that the
broader questions of reliability should be discussed in the context of hearsay and au-
thentication requirements. 5 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 75, § 557.
80. Fenwick & Davidson, supra note 71, at 14.
81. FED. R. EVID. 1004 states:
The original is not required, and other evidence of the contents of a writing,
recording, or photograph is admissible if-
(1) Originals lost or destroyed. -All originals are lost or have been de-
stroyed, unless the proponent lost or destroyed them in bad faith; or
(2) Original not obtainable. -No original can be obtained by any avail-
able judicial process or procedure; or
(3) Original in possession of an opponent. -At a time when an original
was under the control of the party against whom offered, he was put on
notice, by the pleadings or otherwise, that the contents would be a subject
of proof at the hearing, and he does not produce the original at the hear-
ing; or
(4) Collateral matters. -The writing, recording, or photograph is not
closely related to a controlling issue.
82. See, e.g., Schiavone-Chase Corp. v. United States, 553 F.2d 658 (Ct. Cl. 1977)
(computer billing lists admitted where original source documents had been destroyed
after two years in accordance with government policy); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Merla, 142 N.J. Super. 205, 361 A.2d 68 (1976) (trial court's decision to refuse admission
of computer printout due to original invoices being destroyed reversed on appeal).
83. FED. R. EvID. 1006 states:
The contents of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs which can-
not conveniently be examined in court may be presented in the form of a
chart, summary, or calculation. The originals, or duplicates, shall be made
available for examination or copying, or both, by other parties at reasonable
time and place. The court may order that they be produced in court.
84. 5 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 75, § 551 n.45.
85. See State v. Springer, 283 N.C. 627, 197 S.E.2d 530 (1973) (testimony by bank
investigator regarding computer report detailing use of a stolen credit card held inad-
missible because no foundation was laid and the printout itself was not offered into
evidence). For a criticism of Springer, see Sprowl, Evaluating the Credibility of Com-
puter-Generated Evidence, 52 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 547, 561 (1976) (arguing that the in-
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C. Expert Testimony and Scientific Evidence
Several commentators have suggested that computer-generated
analyses, simulations and models86 be used as a basis for expert testi-
mony as a means of getting such evidence before the trier of fact over
hearsay and original writing rule objections.87 Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 703 allows an expert to base his opinion on evidence that
would otherwise be inadmissible.88 However, the computer models
and simulations used as a basis for expert opinion must still be of a
type reasonably relied on by experts in a particular field.89 Where a
party seeks to admit the model itself into evidence, the model will be
treated as scientific evidence. In many jurisdictions this evidence will
have to meet the Frye test, which requires that the scientific tech-
nique be generally accepted by the scientific community to which it
belongs.90
Even where the requirements for expert opinion or scientific evi-
dence have been fulfilled, the evidence may still be barred as unfairly
prejudicial or cumulative.9 1 Whether Federal Rule of Evidence 403
will apply, however, is unclear.92 In any event, courts have used two
methods to overcome Rule 403 objections. The first involves requir-
herent guarantees of reliability within the report should have been considered rather
than just the method in which the evidence reached the court). See also United States
v. DeGeorgia, 420 F.2d 889 (9th Cir. 1969) (testimony presented concerning computer
report indicating that car was not rented and therefore was stolen would have been
barred but defendant failed to raise the best evidence rule and therefore waived
objection).
86. See generally Eastin, The Use of Models in Litigation: Concise or Contrived?,
52 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 610 (1976) (a discussion of the usefulness of models in presenting
evidence and an explanation of basic underlying theories and techniques); Jenkins,
Computer-Generated Evidence Specially Prepared for Use at Trial, 52 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 600 (1976) (discussion of the application of computer models to practical
examples).
87. See Comment, Guidelines for the Admissibility of Evidence Generated by
Computer for Purposes of Litigation, 15 U.C.D. L. REV. 951, 968 (1982).
88. FED. R. EVID. 703 provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opin-
ion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or
before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied on by experts in the particu-
lar field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data
need not be admissible in evidence.
89. See id.
90. For a review of requirements and trends in the admission of scientific evi-
dence, see Lacey, Scientific Evidence, 24 JURIMETRICS J. 254 (1984).
91. FED. R. EVID. 403 states that "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, con-
fusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
92. See, e.g., Harper, Computer Evidence is Coming, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1984, at 80, 81.
ing advance notice of the intention to use a computer simulation. 93
The second involves making the programs used to develop such mod-
els available to counsel in advance of trial.94
One disadvantage of presenting computer-generated testimony
through expert opinion is that the information is admissible only to
establish the basis upon which the expert's opinion was formed and
not for substantive purposes. The court may issue a limiting instruc-
tion under Federal Rule of Evidence 105, instructing the jury to con-
sider the evidence only for the purpose of evaluating the expert's
testimony, and not for the truth of the matter asserted by the evi-
dence. However, the effectiveness of such an instruction is
questionable.95
Due to the trend of allowing expert opinion based both on com-
puter simulations and the simulations themselves, the possibility that
novel expert and scientific evidence will be admitted is strong. Be-
cause computers add a degree of complexity to the admissibililty of
scientific evidence, the need for effective pretrial discovery is
stronger than ever.
D. Authentication and Identification
The "trustworthiness" requirement of the business records excep-
tion is paralleled by a similar concern in the authentication require-
ments. Authentication, a condition precedent to admissibility,
requires that sufficient evidence be produced to support a finding
that the evidence in question is what its proponent claims.96 With re-
spect to computerized information, evidence must be produced sup-
porting the accuracy of the process or system producing the result.97
93. See, e.g., United States v. Russo, 480 F.2d 1228, 1241 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. de-
nied, 414 U.S. 1157 (1974); United States v. Dioguardi, 428 F.2d 1033, 1038 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 825 (1970). See also United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595,
598 (7th Cir. 1978); Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 111, 115 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 987 (1976).
94. See supra note 93.
95. M. GRAHAM, supra note 55, at 323 (arguing that despite a possible limiting in-
struction, FED. R. EVID. 703 acts as an exception to the hearsay rule and an alternative
to authentication requirements).
96. FED. R. EVID. 901(a) states that "[t]he requirement of authentication or identi-
fication as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to
support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims."
97. FED. R. EvID. 901(b) states in part:
(b) Illustrations. -By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation,
the following are examples of authentication or identification conforming
with the requirements of this rule:
(1) Testimony of a witness with knowledge. -Testimony that a matter
is what it is claimed to be.
(9) Process or system. -Evidence describing a process or system used
to produce a result and showing that the process or system produces an
accurate result.
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In proving the accuracy of the system, the same considerations apply-
ing to the "trustworthiness" requirement of the business records ex-
ception and a general evaluation of the credibility of the evidence
should be considered.
98
Establishing that the printout in question is what it purports to be
is an authentication problem that may have to be considered apart
from the business records exception. Because computer printouts are
readily available and often difficult to distinguish, the proponent
should establish a limited chain of custody.99 The printout should be
marked as soon as it is printed. The custodian and others handling
the document should likewise mark the document. Testimony that
the printout is in substantially the same condition as when it left the
computer should be given. A printout could also be self-authenticat-
ing as a certified public document. 1 0 0
IV. EVALUATING THE CREDIBILITY OF COMPUTER-GENERATED
EVIDENCE
Once computer-generated evidence is admitted, some of the same
considerations involved in determining admissibility must be reexam-
ined in more depth. A court, construing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the proponent, may be willing to admit the evi-
dence despite doubts as to its probative value. However, once thresh-
old requirements have been met for purposes of admissibility, the
98. See infra notes 101-21 and accompanying text. See also Comment, Guidelines
for the Admissibility of Evidence Generated by Computer for Purposes of Litigation,
15 U.C.D. L. REV. 951, 958-59 (1982) (arguing that summaries should be held to a
higher standard of reliability than computer analyses and simulations).
99. Fenwick & Davidson, supra note 71, at 22.
100. FED. R. EVID. 902(4) provides for admission of certified public records as
follows:
Extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility
is not required with respect to the following:
(4) Certified copies of public records. A copy of an official record or report
or entry therein, or of a document authorized by law to be recorded or filed
and actually recorded or filed in a public office, including data compilations in
any form, certified as correct by the custodian or other person authorized to
make the certification, by certificate complying with paragraph (1), (2), or (3)
of this rule or complying with any Act of Congress or rule prescribed by the
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority.
For applications of this rule, see United States v. Farris, 517 F.2d 226, 228-29 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975) (officially certified computer printout produced
by Internal Revenue Service admitted into evidence because it was a self-authenticat-
ing public record); Weaver v. State, 404 N.E.2d 1180 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (computer
printout of defendant's driving record admitted over an authentication objection; the
printout was self-authenticating by virtue of being a certified public document).
persuasiveness of the evidence will depend largely upon an advocate's
ability to exploit what one commentator has termed "the inevitable
uncertainties" inherent in any data processing system.1 0 ' Under-
standing these potential weaknesses is crucial, since juries may have
a tendency to overvalue neat tabulations contained in computer
printouts. 0 2
An attorney faced with the task of supporting or attacking com-
puter-generated evidence can benefit from placing himself in the po-
sition of an auditor. An auditor's role is generally to obtain sufficient
and competent evidential matter and render an opinion as to the fair-
ness of an entity's financial statements. 0 3 Auditors have necessarily
had to deal with the problem of whether information contained
within a computer system is reliable. While undertaking a full audit
will generally not be cost effective and may also be precluded by dis-
covery limitations, a certain amount of investigation should take
place.104 Critical points of inquiry include: (1) input procedures; (2)
programs, including testing and documentation; (3) equipment; (4)
safeguarding of information; (5) system security; (6) integrity of the
output; and (7) opportunities for falsification.
Input procedures should be closely examined since the quality of
the output will depend on the quality of the input. 0 5 Input error can
occur in several ways, including the incorrect creation of data, docu-
ment loss, lost data, added data, improper authorization, and im-
proper conversion into machine-readable form. Repetitive
keypunching or typing, which is often used to enter information into
a computer system, increases the probability of error.106 Although
several kinds of input controls are available to eliminate error, 0 7 the
error rate will generally be more than zero because of cost-benefit
considerations.10s Furthermore, controls which are theoretically in
effect may not be followed in reality. The party using the system
101. Fenwick & Davidson, supra note 71, at 21.
102. Commentators have repeatedly noted the danger that juries will tend to over-
value evidence presented in computer printouts. See, e.g., Connery & Levy, Computer
Evidence in Federal Courts, 84 CoM. L.J. 266, 271 (1979); Sprowl, supra note 85, at 547.
103. See, e.g., A. ARENS & J. LOEBBECKE, supra note 12, at 109-10.
104. For a description of the planning and execution of such an investigation, see
DeHetre, Data Processing Evidence-Is It Different?, 52 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 567 (1976).
105. This concept is sometimes phrased "garbage in, garbage out." For an example
of a court taking judicial notice of this principle, see Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Merla,
142 N.J. Super. 205, 361 A.2d 68 (1976).
106. See Sprowl, supra note 85, at 558.
107. Examples of input controls would include keypunch verifying, check digits,
control totals, transmittal controls, and route slips. For example, a control total would
involve summarizing information and then comparing the total to amounts input into
the system. For further information on input controls, see A. ARENS & J. LOEBBECKE,
supra note 12, at 448-49; G. DAVIS, AUDITING & EDP 57-59 (1968).
108. Cost benefit considerations apply to the notion that at some point the cost of
eliminating errors exceeds the costs of allowing the errors to exist. Consequently, a
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should probably provide the actual error rate. 109 If such statistics are
not kept, testing may be necessary. 110
The programs used to process information should also be ex-
amined. Such programs will frequently be used to alter raw data into
a format more convenient for analysis, storage, and subsequent re-
trieval. Program errors are inherent in computer programs, espe-
cially those of greater complexity.1' Whether the system has been
properly documented and tested should strongly indicate the possibil-
ity of such errors. But even where reasonable precautions have been
taken, program errors are not unusual.112 The existence and proper
operation of system controls designed to detect the erroneous
processing of information should be examined. Programs should also
be examined to determine whether the reports generated are slanted
in favor of one party. The possibility of a biased report will depend
in part on the extent to which information is being summarized. 113
The equipment used to process the data should be examined for
the possibility of malfunctions which could result in altered data.
While several commentators take the position that computers are
mechanically reliable and that their proper functioning is of no real
concern in evaluating credibility,114 at least some attention should be
paid to the proper operation of a system's hardware. Indications of
the hardware's reliability include the use of preventative mainte-
nance procedures and the system's downtime record (machine break-
down). Statistics on the equipment's error rate in storing and
retrieving information is another factor. Inquiry should be made into
the controls within the hardware designed to detect alterations in
data, especially where data is transmitted over telephone lines.115
The procedures used by the data processing center in handling re-
ported errors should also be considered.116
The data processing installation procedures for safeguarding
records and files is another area of concern. Data may be acciden-
certain number of errors are tolerated. For further discussion, see Sprowl, supra note
85, at 553.
109. See id. at 558.
110. Id.
111. See G. DAVIS, supra note 107, at 79-81; Sprowl, supra note 85, at 559.
112. See supra note 111.
113. A computer-generated summary was admitted into evidence in United States
v. Russo, 480 F.2d 1228 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1157 (1974). For a vigor-
ous criticism of this holding, see Sprowl, supra note 85, at 552-65.
114. See Note, supra note 58, at 79-80; Sprowl, supra note 85, at 553.
115. G. DAVIS, supra note 107, at 50-51.
116. A. ARENS & J. LOEBBECKE, supra note 12, at 447.
tally destroyed in several ways, including fire, extreme variations in
temperature, power outages, mishandling of data processing equip-
ment and files, and equipment malfunction. While controls are avail-
able to prevent such occurrences,1 17 whether steps have actually been
taken to prevent losses of data is a point of concern. Also relevant is
the procedure for recreating lost files,l11 especially if part of the data
base has actually been destroyed for some reason. Reconstruction
implies that relatively large amounts of data will have to be
processed, thereby increasing the chance that data will be altered.
The security of the system should be questioned because computer-
ized information can be changed without leaving a trace, and because
data processing facilities tend to centralize record keeping functions.
This inquiry will be especially sensitive, due to the natural reluctance
of a business to disclose information that could facilitate tampering
with the system.11 9 Although the extent to which discovery will be
allowed is unclear, some information should be discoverable. Any
weaknesses in security that existed at a relevant point in time should
work to discredit evidence generated by the system. In general, some
controls should be present to limit access to the physical equipment,
the system, and the data storage facilities.12o Whether the system is
protected from external tampering will also be of concern where ac-
cess to the system can be gained over telephone lines.1 21
The integrity of the output data should also be considered. Be-
cause computer reports are easily printed and often indistinguishable,
evidence should be produced that indicates that the specific report of-
fered at trial was produced in accordance with whatever controls are
theoretically in use.
The identity of the party offering the computer report into evi-
dence and the identity of the computer's owner are other factors to
be considered in arguing the credibility of computer-generated infor-
mation. Where the printout is offered by a party who had sole pos-
session and control of the computer and had the motive to falsify
information contained therein, such information should be subjected
to close scrutiny.
117. Examples of processing controls include tests for invalid data, crossfooting
tests, reasonableness tests, and file and label controls. For a further explanation of
such controls, see A. ARENS & J. LOEBBECKE, supra note 12, at 449-50; G. DAVIS, Supra
note 107, at 87-102.
118. For a description of backup procedures, see G. DAVIS, supra note 107, at 95-101.
119. See Harper, supra note 92, at 83 (commenting that banks are opposed to strong
foundational requirements for the admission of computer records).
120. For a further discussion of security measures, see W. PERRY, THE ACCOUNT-
ANTS' GUIDE TO COMPUTER SYSTEMS 261-75 (1982).
121. For an example of the dangers "hacking" poses to a security system, see
Sandza, The Revenge of the Hackers, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 10, 1984, at 81.
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V. CONCLUSION
The growing use of computer-generated evidence requires that the
practitioner become proficient in dealing with the discovery and use
of such evidence. While becoming familiar and comfortable with
computers may require a certain amount of study, the basic princi-
ples needed to understand such devices are not complicated. Com-
puterized evidence is unique. Its attempted admissibility requires
that certain considerations, especially reliability, be emphasized to a
greater degree. However, the basic principles of discovery and evi-
dence still generally apply. These principles, and not the operation of
the computer, must be emphasized.
RICHARD M. LONG

